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THE CASE FOR CAUTION 




On any election day, interested ciu7.cns want to know one thing-who woo. 
News organi7.ations are in the business of geuing accurate rc$ultS to !heir 
liudience as quickly as possible. but counting actual votes takes hours, and 
sometimes days. 
Beginning in the early 1%Os. news organizations developed ways of pro-
jccting lIIe outcome of races in order to speed the process of report ing before 
votes were actually counted. 1lx:y began 10 develop methods and systems of 
modeling and JXllling that could indicate. statistical ly. the likely winner in 
any given race. The motive was to give the audience whal it wanted--thc 
faster, the beuer. Of course., the news media intended to make their projcctiOO5 
as acCUl"'dtc as possible. 
In lime. poll ing and analysis became increasingly sophisticated. Results 
from preelection s.ampk.s, a long with extrapolations from precinct models., 
exit polls. and partial election returns, were combined into what I will refer 
to as the networks' clcclion~ay pol1ing and projection system. This system 
provided th: basis for making election projections faster and belter, meaning 
with fewer mistakes. Year after year, the systems were improved, spurred on 
by competition among the news organi7.ations to be the first to repon OUtCOmes 
10 their audiences. Not incidentally. the highly competitive polling and pr0-
jection business grew increasingly rostly. 
In 1990. the first network pool for exit polling and projections. Voter Re-
search and Surveys (VRS), was formed with the ml.cntioo to mc<:! the in-
creasing costs and share expenses. Cost sharing made it possible for the 
networks to provide the greatest sweep of polling. Without the pool, the 
networks would have had to restrict their reach and covcr.lgc because ofbudgct 
limitations. Of course, in journal istic lenns, pooling meant the information 
would be less re liable. While the networks could, by combining resources, 
undertake larger poll ing opcr.ltK)IIS and more sophislkalCd modeling that could 
reduce the ri'ik of eertain types of error. the vulnernbility of the networks to 
_o,o-Qooon<d) _ .1:Cm-OOO 6 lim ~ .. __ ... _ 0,0-_ 
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any errors that did result was increased. When data are wrong, with ooly one 
source of infonnalion, !here is no opportunity for correction. Nevenheless, 
financial considerations trumped rcliabitity-and the best practices of 
journal ism. 
By election day 2000, after several pennutations, a comprehensive polling 
and projection system was in place backed by a consonium of five television 
networks and the Associated Press. Its purpose was to collect and disseminate 
polling data and voting information by which news organizations could make 
their independent calis, maintaining an clement of competition among them. 
In thinking about this system in its entirety, we must consider not only the 
Voter News Service (VNS), the rcconstiw LCd eonsortium operation, but also 
the analysis and reponing operations of the separate octworks as well . 
ql The system was economical. and it was fast. But was it accurate? The 
answer: not as accumte or as reliable as it was intended, promised, or needed 
to oc, especially when it eame to calling a very elose race. We learned that 
answer on election night 2000. At the core of the reporting problem were two 
mistaken projections in one state, Florida, which turned out to be key to the 
outcome of the national election. TIle television networks and other news 
outlets twice projected the winner and twice recalled those projections. News 
executives, particularly television news executives, as well as editors, cor-
respondents, and prodUCCf"S themselves dcscribed election-night covcrage as 
a '·debacle:' a "disaster," and a ·'fiasco.'" 
Something had gone wrong-tcnibly wrong-in the polling and projection 
system. It is not the purpose of this anicle to fcrret out the exact sources of 
the errors on that night. The experiences of election night 2000 do. however. 
serve as a useful lens through which to examine the overall efficacy of the 
system that was in place. It is my contention that this system is too fr.l.ught 
with the potcntial for error for news organi7.ations to rely on its projections 
in the way that they havc in the recent past. 
Background 
Several reports and reviews were commissioned by the networks to examine 
the pcrfonnance of television news on election night 2000. (For funher in-
fonnation, see the aniele by Fr.l.nkovie in this symposium, and the full network 
reports in the appendix in the electronic version of the journal.) CNN asked 
thrce journalists, Ben Wattenberg, Jim Risser, and me. to constitute an in-
dependent panel to investigate its performance on clection night to detcnnine 
the following: What went wrong'! Why did it happen? What should be done 
I. We shoukl DC)Ie. also. that 1-lorida Wa!i DOt the only itaIe in the 2000 election in whi<;:h 
projections _re made based on exit polls and models that later were rct..,tcd. MiSIa,k~n calls 
w~re made in New Muioo and Washingtoo Stale. and DOl unLiI ...0'" "'liable and compleIC 
iDforlt!lll.ioo Ix:came avaiJ .. 1e. were !he actual outcomes in those ~ knoWD. 
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to guard against a recurrence in fmurc elections (Konner. Risser. and Wat-
tenberg 2OO1)? 
In our report to G'lN, we said that among the most obvious failings were 
an emphasis on speed over accuracy in rcporting; excessive competition and 
lhe pressure to come in flfSl; outdated technology; human error; a nawed 
polling and projection system; and. finally. overconfidence in the system and 
in the polls themselves. We Slated. "On elcclion day 2000, television news 
organizations staged a collective dr.lg rnce on the crowded highway of de-
mocracy, rcckJessly endangering the electoral process, the politicaJ life of the 
country and their own credibility, all for reasons that may be conceptually 
nawcd.and commercially questionable." (The full text of our report is included 
in the electronic version of thc joumaJ as an appendix to this symposium) 
The failure of the IlCWS media and all that followed from it may be un-
forgivable, but it was oot unforeseeable. Although election polling and pro-
jcction techniques have grown increasingly sophisticated and reliable over the 
more than )0 years during which the systems have been evolving, their p0-
tential for error has nOl been eliminated. Estimates made from models and 
samplcs arc always subjcct to a margin of error and built- in distortions, factors 
taken into account by the professionals. However, in addition to factors that 
are subject to calculable margins of error, various nonsampIing factors., the 
effects of which are more difficult to gauge. have surfaced over lime, for 
example, increasing numbers of early and absentee voters, increasing non-
response in exil polls, and misreponing of vote retums. 1llese nonsampling 
factors can distort the resul ts. More than 01lC factor can act simul lanCOusly, 
and the errors can be reenforcing in specific instances. In very close races. 
the variables can lead to significant and COStly error. In the case of elcction 
2<XX1, they did. 
Before election 2000, the system had performed remarkably well . Mistakes 
were made in the past. but they were few in number and never as damaging 
as they would be in election 2000. Now we have the experience that. alleast 
in very close races like the Bush-Gore one, the system has provcn itself \0 
be much less reliable than the public has been led to believe, and perhaps 
less reliable than even the professionals had thought. 
Much of what follows is developed from material and infonnalion gathered 
for "Television's Perfonnance on Ek."Ction Night 2000: A Repan for CNN" 
(Konncr, Risser, and Wattenberg 2001). I periodically quote from interviews 
conducted in conncction with Lhc preparation of thaI repon. The reader should 
note that I undenake this review as a journalist. not an expen on paUing or 
statislical methods. I shall aucmpt to layout the case for caution, based on 
what we learned in preparing our repon. 
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The System and How It Works 
Voter News Service (VNS), the pooled exit polling, vote tabulation, and 
outcome projection service in place for election day 2000, was fonned in 
1993 through a merger of two predecessor organizations. The mcm~hip 
was talcr expanded and the organi7.ation was modified in its structure. For 
this election, VNS was funded and operated by a consortium of five television 
networks (ABC, CBS, CNN. Fox News, and NBC) and the Associated Press. 
and in 2000 it operated under a single head. It gathered preelection data. 
conducted exit polls. collected actual VOle results. and projected winners. Many 
prim and broadcast outlets subscribed to the service. All relied on VNS data 
on eJection night. The budget of VNS was $35 million. $33 million o f it from 
the networks and the AP. a.nd the rest (rom subscribers. 
Voter News Service engaged in scvcr.tJ data collection operations: exit polls 
in sample precincts, and vote tabulations from a largcr sample, including 
tabulations from a selected group that reported early. It also obtaincd actual 
tabulated vote totals from a largcr group of sample precincts and vote tabu-
lations from cvcry county. In addition, VNS did its own analysis of the data 
and made predictions. 
Thc data collected by VNS were processed through a series of calculations 
and decision models. Decision models wcre designed on the basis of pree-
lection research, polling, and analysis, including data on voter charncteristics 
in selected counties and sample precincts and analysis of voting paUerns in 
prior races. This preelection research provided key elements of the decision 
modcls by which the eleclion-day data were to be evaluatcd. 
All the information was processed through various computer models and 
transmiued to members and subscribers for all House, Senate. and guberna· 
torial races, as well as the state-by-state vote for PrcsidcnL Projections were 
made from a numbcT or sample precincts, which were intended to mirror the 
wider population. A subset of this sample of precincts is selectcd for exit 
poll ing. In Rorida, 120 precincts out of 5,885 were designated sample pre-
cincts, for which quick reporting of results 10 VNS was prearrangcd. Exit 
polling was conducted in 45 of these precincts. In these precincts, voters were 
sampled systematically, wi th sample sizes set to keep sampling error withi n 
tolerable limits. Selected voters indicated who they thought they had just 
voted for by fil ling OUi questionnaires that also included questions about issues 
and key demogrJphics. 1lte results from the exit poll precincts were used to 
call races before tabulal.cd actual resul ts wcre in hand if the decision models 
dctennincd Ihat a candidate had a sufficient lead in the exit polL In very close 
races. a call must wait until Ihe t.1bulation of a significant number of actual 
votes from sample precincts. Whcn !.here wcre consistent indications of a clear 
Icad for a candidate. VNS made the call for the estimated winner. 
Voter News Service was only one part of the system of decision making 
on election nighL Its call is not the call thaI reaches viewcrs and voters. The 
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networks and I~WS organizations also had their own decision desks to analyrJ: 
and imerpret the VNS data; CNN and CBS collabor.lted with a shared decision 
desk. The decision desks wcre eharged with making projections. independent 
of other news organizations. based on the data and information received. They 
would then make their recommendations to the news executi ves in charge, 
who would authorize the information that was given to the public. The news 
decision desks varied from VNS calls and projections several limes during 
the coverage thai evening. At times VNS led the networks; at other times 
VNS foll owed or, as it turned out in the network call for Bush, VNS did not 
make the call at all. 
Thus, it is Lhe individuals at the decision desks in each of the news or-
ganizations who arc responsible for making the calls that arc announced to 
the public as "projected winners." Those on the decision desk arc experienced 
analysts of the kind of data that reaehes them from VNS. They look: at the 
constantly changing, multiple screens of data provided to them via VNS 
computer hookups, and they interpret these data. They then make their rec-
ommendations to the responsible news personnel, and the news executives 
make. or auiliorize, the call . They do so in a context where minutes count 
and compcli tive pressures are prominent. As stated in CBS's postelection 
report, "the Election Night broadcast occurs in a cauldron of competitive heat" 
with each individual and each network burning to be the besl and the first. 
TIlere were other sources of data and information available as well. The 
AP had its own data collection system, not as comprehensive as VNS's, but 
available to all AP subscribers, including the networks. The AP's votc-counl-
ing system was nOt tied into the VNS system. Official Slale. county. and local 
vote tabulat ions were also available, albei t on a slower timetable. BUI as 
emerged in the several postmonems. in the race to be first. despite many 
warning flags concerning the VNS dala throughout the evening, the backup 
sourees were ignored. 
Unlike the IlCtwOrkS. the Ap, relying on its own independent report ing. held 
back from making the second, mistaken. call (for Bush). In facl VNS, acutely 
aware of errors in its system earlier in the evening, also held back on projecting 
Bush the winner. Even without projections from VNS and the AP. all the 
networks plunged ahead on thai call without checking any of their other 
possible sourees. 
In short, the news organizations relied on a single souree of information 
and lacked. or did not make usc of. the checks and balances required for 
re liable reporting. The pooling concept itself explains. at least in part, why 
election 20Cl0 was "an accident waiting to happen." With the broad outlines 
of ilie system described. let us review some of the areas in which uncertainties, 
approximations, random variations, omissions, and just plain mistakes can 
lead to wrong rcsulLs. 
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Exit Polls 
Exit polls arc the means of gathering data from voters after they vote, as they 
leave the polling ccnt.er. The exit polls are conducted throughout the day in 
a selected sample of precincts throughout a state. A person from the local 
community, trained in advance, usually distributes the questionnaires in the 
exit JXIII. The interviewer asks selected voters to fill out a question-
naire--5Qlnclimes a short questionnaire, sometimes a longer one. 
Three limes during election day, the interviewer tabulates the votes from 
those questionnaires and calls in the information 10 VNS. The interviewer 
also reports informat;on about the total number of voters and the response 
rate 10 the exit polL The exit poll responses arc entered inlo an exit poll 
database. In precincts where the actual vote counts are avai lable early, they 
are used as a ehcck on the accuracy of the exit poll resul ts. In many elections, 
exit polls alone do not provide the information neccssary to call a race. In 
some cases, the sample is too small, and actual vO(e counl~ are collected in 
the particular exit-poll precinct in order to make the projection. 
In one of our interviews with Warren Mitofsky, he referred to exit polls as 
"blunt instruments;' meaning that many factors come into play that can distort 
the findings. Among the variablcs Ibat may affect accuracy arc Ibe quality of 
the questiOnnaire; the training and quality of the field personnel; the respon-
siveness of the voter and, therefore, the degree of nonresponse; the locatioo 
of the interviewer in relation to lhe polling location; and the truthfulness of 
the responses. Some voters deliberately falsify information. One known dis-
tortion in exit polls is that they tend to overrepresent Democrats, a distortion 
that is taken imo account in the calculations. NonrcsJXInse is a growing prob-
lem in exit polling. Added to these difficulties, different locations have dif-
ferent rules governing where the pollsters may slatld. Many JXIl1 ing locations 
have problems with several exits and vllrying restrictions and guidelines for 
the pollsters. Some locations require lhat pollslers stand at least 50 fcct away 
from the polling location. These local variables could playa role in j ust how 
accurate an exit poll can be. For these reasons and others, exit poll data do 
not always reflect the final margin. There is always sampling error. from the 
sample of precincts drawn and from the sample of vO(ers drawn within each 
precinct. Bill Schneider, CNN's on-air pol itical analyst, opined in an interview 
conducted for the CNN repon that taking exit poll information from one 
source is "inherently risky:' 
In Florida, many of these factors came into play and were at the root of 
faulty results from the cxit polls. Nonrcsponse was a problem, with unknown 
consequences for oonresponse bias. In some cases the interviewer did not 
select the right voters. Some interviewers were positioned poorly. In one 
location, the interviewer was nO( able to intercept a singlc vOler. There were 
situations in which one candidate's voters seemed more willing than the other 
to complete exit poll questionnaires. In a postelcction memo, Warren Mitofsky, 
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the head of the joint CBSlCNN decision desk and widely recognized as the 
man who bui lt the polling and projection system, reponed that at the time: 
tlcearly call for Gore wa .. made, the exit poll in Tampa was offby 16 percent 
due to an overstatement of the vote for Gore. (lbis same figure was reported 
in the postelection review from Murray Edelman. the editorial director of 
VNS.) 'The actual vote from Tampa was not yet avai lable at the lime, so the 
faulty exit poll formed pan of the basis of thc mistaken call for Gore. In 
Miami, too. the exit poll was also significantly off in favor of Gore. ( Ironically. 
at 7:45. just before the mistaken eall for Gore was made, according to the 
CNN decision team, wi th 4 percent of the vote counted, Bush, not Gore, was 
in the lead by 6 percem.) According to Mitofsky, other precincts were off as 
well because of overstatement for Gore. Edelman wrote. '1'hc real ity is there 
is some risk in making calls from models" (Voter News Service 2(00). 
In Rorida, those who did panicipate, that is, the people who did repon 
how they had voted, assumed that their votes were being counted. That was 
not necessarily the case. Many votes were not counted. Also, many people 
voted incorrectly on what tunll.,od out to be a very confusing ballot Thehanging 
chads. Ute om-fully-perforated chads, and the butterfly ballot became famous 
icons of voter confusion and disenfranchisement in the aftermath of the Aorida 
vote. The fai lure to recoro some intended votes may have further distorted 
the exit poll findings. 
In a postelection review, it was also noted that VNS was able to staff only 
84 percem of the sample prccillCtS nationwide (meaning lilat 16 percent of 
the precincts were oot covered). 1be VNS report (2001) stated that exit poll ... 
data were received from all but one precinct As the RTI repon (Biemer et 
al. 2001) states, "This was imjX)rtant because vote tabulations feed into the 
projection modcls." Moreover, there were some issues of qualilY colllrol of 
the data collcclion activities. both in the training and supervision of the work-
ers. Adequate staff goes to the very foundation of the usefulness of jX)lls. 
In sum, the VNS exit polls in Aorida were judged to be inaccurate, with 
implications for exit polling generally. One can assume that many of the same 
distortions and errors occurred elsewhere, but the rdCCS were not so close as 
to make these varialions critical in the projections. We should note that there 
were problems in other states as well. In Alabama. Georgia, and Nonh Car-
olina. exit polls reported a closer race than what proved to be the eventual 
outcome. Part of the problem was identified to be a result of too small a 
sample of exit poll precincts. 
A postelection memo from Mitofsky and Joe Lcnski, Milofsky's associate 
and panncr on the decis ion desk, stated that on election day 2000 VNS's cxit 
poll overstated the Gore vote in 22 states and overstated the Bush vote in 
nine states. In only 10 states, the exit polls matched actual results. The VNS 
jX)sldection report says its exit poll estimates showed the wrong winner in 
eight states. The fau lty exit jX)\ls actually resul ted in lilree wrong calis (Konner, 
Risser, and Waucnberg 200 1, app. 4). 1bc CNN rcpon concluded that exit 
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polls are useful for analyzing voting pattems after an election. They are not 
reliable in projecting outcomes of elections. The latter t.ask requires a degree 
of precision that exit polls eannot reliably deliver whcn a race is closc. 
Modeling and the Precinct Sample 
Thc cxit polls teU directly what happened in 3 small number of sampled 
precincts. It is only by plugging lhese resul ts into 3 larger projection model 
that VNS analysts are able to estimate the percentage of votes that each 
candidate will get statcwide. Statistical models arc complex. The choice of 
who and what to model is very important, and there is no escaping lhe fact 
that lhe projected result is driven by infonnation drawn from a small portion 
of the votes that will be casl. 
All those responsible for e lection-night projections admit that no one expects 
models to be entirely accurate. They aeknowledge that any estimate is an 
estimate only, and they operate on the assumption that there is a one·in-200 
risk of error across all races. Theseodds are based essentially on cons iderations 
of sampling error, and do not fully take into account nonsampling sources of 
error. It is probably not well known or well advcniscd to the gcneral public 
that any statistical model can be inaccurate and that the possibil ity of error 
iocreascs in close elections. 
The models for covering this election were built based 00 the sclection of 
a sample of prec1llCts and polling within some of those precincts. (Later on 
election night, actual vote tabulations are used 3100g with those for which 
only exit poll results arc known.) 1nc sampled precincts arc intended to mirror, 
statistical ly, the general population of the state. There is a potential for error 
in selecting sample precincts, as well as a potential for errors in the sampling 
of voters. Many dynamic factors in sampling and polling makc models less 
stable than they may appear; among them are changes within key precincts, 
absentee and early voting, and the quality of the exit poll results that constitute 
the key input for thc model. We have reviewed above some of the factors 
affecting exit poll results. 
There was another problem on this e lection nighL The projection of results 
from the sample precinCLSOnto the entire Slate was accomplished by comparing 
the election-night results with vote retums from the pasL Only one past race 
was used in this estimation procedure. Results can be skewed due to the choice 
of a particular prior race for comparison. In Florida, the algorithm in usc by 
VNS selected the 1998 gubernatorial e lection as the past race that would 
provide the best possible basis for projection on e lection night. It turned out 
to be the wrong race to usc. In hindsight, it was determined that e ither the 
1996 presidential election or the 1998 Senate race would have provided 3 
more useful comparison. In a dose race, every little modeling assumption 
counts, and so it did in this one. 
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Murray Edelman's postelection report on VNS pcrfonnance (quoted in 
Konner, Risser, and Wattenberg 2(01) noted that prior to this election, mooels 
have been used to call approximately 2000 election races, and only six errors 
had occurred. 111at may bave been a reason for confidence, but it should nO( 
have been for overconfidence. There is always a risk in making cal ls from 
these models, as the professionals themselves acknowledged. Small early pre-
cinct samples were a leading cause of the erroneous call for Gore early in 
the evening; if more precincts had been included in the exit poll, the results 
of the projection at that early stage may have been closer to the actual statewide 
result. (Later, the erroneous call for Bush revealed actual errors in the vote-
tabulation process as well as deficiencies in the computer model's assumptions 
about thc outstanding vote yet to be counted.) 
The RTI review (Biemer et aI. 2001) praised VNS's preelection research 
that went into creating the models. The research was described as "appropriate" 
and ''wcll-dcsigncd'' with ''timely infonnation" on voters, their prefcrences, 
their characteristics, their opinions, and more. U nothing else, what Florida 
provided was evidence that statistical sampling can go wrong. As one election 
consultant put it, "Sometimes good samples produce bad estimates." Statistical 
sampling went terribly wrong in Florida and-along with other diffieul-
tics-cxaccrbatcd the modeling problems. 
Response Rate 
There is a downward trend, in general, in the willingness of people to rcspond 
to polls. This is a growing threat to the accuracy of election polling generally. 
The average response rate in the 2000 exit polls was 5 1 percen\., a drop from 
55 percent in 1996 and 60 percent in 1992. The pau.cm is sometimes referred 
to as "polling fatigue." POlling for commercial and pol.itical pwposcs is widely 
used-probably ovcruscd--and more and more people are refusing to panie-
ipate. The resul t of a lower response rate is a correspondingly higher risk of 
nonrcsponse bias. This occurs when the votes of those who do not respond 
are substantially different from the votes of those who do ehoose to be part 
of the poll. Thal, added to traditional problems, such as individuals who eannot 
be contacted, ean yield a sample that is either too small or skewed. A bias 
in sample estimates is not to be confused with deliberate bias. Many repre-
sentatives in Congress believe that both the polling and the projeetions arc 
deliberalely or Unconsciously biased to favor one candidate over another. We 
did not find any evidence to support that view. What we did find is that, in 
general, response rate to any surveyor sample is a growing problem for the 
industry. While there is no clear evidence that nonresponse played any large 
role in the Florida debacle, the decl ining response rate leaves the syslem 
increasingly vulnerable to error. Thc lack of nonrcsponse bias in one poll or 
precinet docs not guarantee that it will be absent in another. 
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Precinct Changes 
Since the projection models incorporate a direet comparison of current precinct 
resull~ with those from a past election in the same precincts, it is crucial that 
each precinct represent the same set of potential voters as it did in the past 
racc. 111c Rorida samplc precincts wcre selected from thc 1996 presidential 
race. Between 1996 and 2000, some precinct boundaries and names were 
changed by election officials. These changes sometimes produce demographic 
or other shifts that can make models inaccurate or obsolete. While a shift in 
one sample precinct can be insignificant in a race where one candidate dom-
inates significan tly, in a very close race it can cause serious flaws in the 
calculations. 
Early and Absentee Voting 
More and more people are voting before election day and voting by absentee 
ballot. In some states. early voting is pcnnitted in specific locations. Oregon 
has adopted a system of voting by mail. The VNS projection model did not 
sufficiently takc into account a surge in absentee ballots in Florida. 
Phone surveys were conducted by VNS in three states in which the absentee 
vote was expected to be especially significant-Callfomia, Oregon, and Wash-
ington. The sampling in Aorida did not take into account the full weight of 
Rorida's absentee vote. Based on past races, VNS estimated that there would 
be a 7.5 percent absentee vote. In fact, 12 percent of the vote was cast by 
absentee ballOL Also, the absentcc vote was projected to be 15.3 percent more 
Republican than the election-day vote. In the final tally, the absentcc vOtC 
turned out to be 23.7 percent more RepUblican than !.he election-day vote. 
Clearly, ror any polling information to be accurate in projecting the outcome 
of an election, there has 10 be some means for accounting for this growing 
segment of voters. Pollsters say there are ways to do this, but it would cost 
significantly more. It is doubtful that this kind of polling wHl be adopted 
unless the expense issue can be overcome. 1be increasing numbers of absentee 
voters may tum out to be one of the biggest problems to overcome in polling 
for the purpose of projection. 
Other Issues 
Therc were many other problems with the data in the Florida election. The 
most significant were attributable to technical and human error. a breakdown 
in communications, and voting irregularities. Election workers improperly 
entered votes into the computer. Precinct workcrs incorrectly copied or misread 
ballot tallies. Faulty tabulations were entered into the tolal vote. In Duval 
County, there was a significant key-punch error. There was an especially large 
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error (rom Volusia County that exaggerated Bush's lead, A memory card 
malfu nctioned, This is not to mention the large number of ballot irroguJari-
tics--votel'S being challenged. voter errors. and incomplcte voting, Errors and 
computer problems were not conununicated to the decision desks, At one 
poinl, late on election nighl, there was a serious miscalculation of the number 
of votes that remained to be COUnted. To be sure, some of these errors were 
made by local government workers rather than VNS staff. But when the errors 
are large enough and not deteclCd soon enough, they affect the accuracy of 
the projectcd election result. 
Follow-up studies also revealed that there were problems with outdated 
equipment. with the software. and with quality control. In sum, there was a 
serious underestimation of the true total error in the eslimatcs, TIle true pr0b-
ability of calling the race wrong was far greater than the "ooc·in--200" estimate 
that VNS had set as its guideline in building its models. Beyond that., it is 
questionable whether even those optimistic odds arc acceptable. And there is 
reason to wonder whether those odd~ are actually respected in the moment 
of highest heat in the "cauldron of compcliIKm," 
The Rush to Be First 
In our rcpon 10 G'lN, we wrote that the networks indulged in "cxcessivc 
speed" in makjng their election-night projections and calls. Predictably, those 
on the decision desk said that was not the case and that those who believe 
that the pressure to be first outweighs the pressure (Q be accurate are "cynics." 
This "we saidl!.hey said" COIltroversy cries out for corrunon sense. The brief 
amount of time separaling the networks in making both the faulty Florida 
calls, as well as other calls throughout the evening. dearly points to what one 
news executIve called an "anus race." 
In our report to CNN, we concluded thai thcse calls being so close to each 
other docs not allow sufficien t time for reasoned judgment and decision mak· 
ing. We largely discounted the dccisioo leam's insistcnce that time pressure 
was not a problem in calling Rorida prematurely. lime pressures are the 
whole reason for !.he usc of cxit polls and other devices in calling the winners 
of stales before the actual compUialion of complete returns is known, Tom 
Johnson. then chairman and COO of the CNN News Group. backed this up. 
Ue said. '1'hc competitive drive to be first played a powerful role. It's more 
important to be righl, bUi in the pressure of the eleelion. there is a raw 
competitive race to be first. like athletes on the playing Held." Or a.~ another 
decision makcr said, "Thcre is at leasl the fear of being len behind," 
Anyone who hall worked in a IlCwsroom, or been in a LClevision news 
COIltrol room. especially on an election nighl, as I have, knows that Johnson's 
characteriZation is accurate, News docs IlOl operate in a time vacuum. Dead-
lines are and always have been an imperative in the news business, in tandem 
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with the impemLive to beat the (;ompeLiLion. Today. willi deadlines every 
second on television and on-line. the pressure is even greater. That does not 
mean there is nOl equal, maybe greater, pressure to be accurntc, but the rush 
to judgment in news reponing has accelerdted, with a growing number of 
inaccurdcies and mistakes to documeDl iL Even the most respected mainstream 
news organu.ations have thrown principle to the wind to get the story, get it 
first, or, at the least, nOl be tOO far behind the competition . 
Television critics also playa role in increasing the pressure of time on the 
news networks. The cri tics may analyze CODlent in their weekJy columns o r 
on their weekly media review programs, but in their daily news coverage, 
they rank the networks like racchones. As one CNN executive put it, "If we 
don'{ come in first, the critics would say 'CNN was weak,' when we would 
say 'We were responsible.· .. 
News reponing may be regarded by some as a competitive sport. But to 
the citizens, to the country, to democracy itself, and, one would hope. to 
journalists, reporting is nOl a game. Reponing election resul ts is as important 
as journalism gets-especially in a presidential election. This is ourdemocratic 
life. Presidential elections, and other e lections as well, determine the locus of 
power. On election night we witness the orderly tr.msfer of power in the 
world's grcatc5t democmcy. A:s Dan Rather. CBS News anchor, said 0fI elec-
tion night 2000, "This is as close as we come to a kind of sacred time in this 
country." 
Conclusion 
Polling has become standard in reporting on elections. Findings gcncrated by 
the polling industry make news every day. To challenge polls or the poll ing 
system is to challenge a religion of statistics. But polls arc statistical calcu-
lations, not facrual realities. They arc imperfect measures of voter intcDl and 
acrual voting, aOO their inaccuracies are especially perilous in close e lections. 
While the record before e lection 2000, and even for election 2000, was, for 
the most part, a record of success, moch of that socccss came from e lections 
where the outcome was relatively clear-cut Eaeh of the postelection reports 
and the memornnda noted above cited problems and made I'CCQmmendations. 
'They dealt with many facets of the difficulties encountered in the Florida 
reporting. But many of the problems were directly re lated to the polling and 
projection system. Consequenuy, there is a growing awareness that there is 
a need for more cautious and considered usc of c1cction-day data derived 
from the exit polls. 
Thc inquiry we eonducted for CNN and the judgments and recommen-
dations we made in our repon were based on the ideals, the principles, and the 
best practices of journalism. Our evaluation of CNN's perfonnance on election 
night 2(()() was based on the following principles, stated in the report: 
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ThaI the central purpose of a free press in a democratic: SOCielY is 10 provide the 
public with information upon which the people can form iotelligent decisioos 
cooccmiog importanl public matters 00 whicb they have the power 10 act; 
That public affaifll journalism ill the pursuit of truth in the public iotcn:st. aod 
its major values are accuracy. fairnes~. blllllflCt:. respon~ibility. accountability. 
iDdependeoce. iotegrity and timeliocss. 
We believe that al l the journalists involved in election coventge at CNN 
subscribe to those principals. Ncvenheless, we concluded !hat because of 
5CvCrai factors, CNN, along with the other telcvision networks. failed in their 
core mission: to inform the public accurately about the outeome of the election. 
We reported an impulse to speed over accuracy, and we atuibuted that impulse 
to the business imperativcs of television ncws--to win the highest ratings, 
which is not a joumaJistic standard but a commercial standard. 1be ratings 
drive the price of commercials, and conunercials detcnnine the bouorn-line 
profits of the corporations that own the news networks. There was substantial 
evidence in the postelection reports that the polling and projection system in 
place. and many of Ihe problems thai resulted, were budget driven. from 
outdated technology to underpaid workers. As stated by Bernard Shaw, one 
of the anchors of CNN's election-night coverage. '1lle network newsroom 
culture is that decis ions are made and actions are taken in ways that are driven 
by ratings and profits:' 
We are living now in the conunercial age of telcvision. The botlom line 
contrOls the thinking, the decisions. and the actions of lhose at the top of the 
corporate ladder. There is no doubt that then: is an equation between money 
and [ruth in news. and lhat more money is needed to improve the system. 
Again and again in the postmortems, budget issues emerged as a dctcnnining 
factor in decisions as an answer to many of the problems. 1bc nctworks may 
argue that the operation is already tOO costJy, but one ean easily conclude 
from any of the networks' annuaJ reporu that they can well afford it. 
Some journalists feci it is irresponsible to make any projection, and that 
all reponing shouk! wait until actual votes are counted. Some argue that calling 
any race before a U the polls have closed throughout the country depresses 
the number of voters. Studies on this issue have nOl olTered any conclusive 
evidence:. In our report. we concluded lhal. polls have some value as preelection 
indicators and for postclection analysis. It is clear that there is a great deal 
of work to be done if the polling and projection system is to be fixed . 
Rerommendations 
Among the recommendations thai were offered in the report to CNN were 
the following: 
Networks should emphasize accuracy over speed, and make this com-
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mitment known. 
Voter News Service should be reexamined, fixed, or reinvented. 2 
A second source of information should be available. 
Viewers shookl be bcuer informed concerning the sources of 
information. 
Exit polls should be used for analysis purposes only. 
No eall should be made until al l the polls in thai state are closed. 
Cal l states on the basis of acUlal counted returns. 
No ca11 should be made until al.1 avai lable sources of infonnation arc 
checked. 
Cease the usc of exit polling to project or call winners of states. 
Finally, we recognized in the report that the practices recommended woukl 
noticeably slow election-night reporting. We wrote, "Given the problems 
noted, we do not regard this as a bad thing. To the contrary, we believe such 
an outcome would result in clear benefits to JOUrnal ism and democracy." 
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